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Abstract
We evaluate the effect of highly salient disclosure of private
college and university president compensation on subsequent
donations. Using a differences-in-discontinuities approach to
compare institutions that are highlighted in the Chronicle of
Higher Education’s annual “top 10” list of most highlycompensated presidents against similar others, we find that
appearing on a top 10 list is associated with reduced average
donations of 4.5 million dollars in the first full fiscal year
following disclosure, despite greater fundraising by “top 10”
schools. We also find some evidence that top 10 appearances
slow the growth of compensation, while increasing enrollment,
in subsequent years. We interpret these results as consistent
with the hypothesis that donors care about compensation but
are typically inattentive to pay levels. We discuss the
implications of these findings for the regulation of nonprofits
and for our broader understanding of the pay-setting process at
for-profit as well as nonprofit organizations.
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1. Introduction
Nonprofit organizations are characterized by a separation of ownership from control
that leads to predictable agency problems. (Glaeser 2003, Steinberg 1990). As in the forprofit sector (Bebchuck, Fried, and Walker 2002), those agency problems could result in
excessive executive pay. To be sure, there is a line of argument in the nonprofit literature
that “the people attracted to managerial positions in the non-profit sector are those who
care relatively little about financial gain,” and hence need little oversight. (RoseAckerman 1987; for similar sentiments, see Jobome 2006, Ballou & Weisbrod 2003,
Roomkin & Weisbrod 1999, Rose-Ackerman 1996, and Fama & Jensen 1983). As a
consequence, some have argued that “boards should not necessarily invest in …
mechanisms … to curb … CEO pay excesses.” (Jegers 2008).
Whether and to what extent agency problems affect executive pay in the nonprofit
sector is an open question. While scholars have closely studied the consequences of
similar agency problems in the context of managerial pay among for-profit firms (see
Walker 2012 for a recent overview), this has not been the case for nonprofit organizations.
Prior work has explored different views of the objective functions of nonprofit firms. (See
Horwitz & Nichols 2009 for a review.) But there has been little examination of the impact
executive pay structures may have on the objective functions of nonprofit managers.
Moreover, even if it is the case that nonprofit managers are less motivated by cash
than others, they may still be interested enough to make investments in monitoring
worthwhile. Galle & Walker (2013), drawing on theories of managerial power in the for-
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profit sector, sketch a framework in which nonprofit managers with even modest interest
in monetary rewards can extract rents from their firms relatively easily.
Galle & Walker (2013) also argue that donors represent a potential source of
monitoring and executive pay discipline in the nonprofit sector. But in order to serve this
monitoring/disciplining role, it must be the case that 1) donors are aware (at some level) of
nonprofit executive compensation, 2) care about these pay levels, and 3) respond, in
aggregate, negatively to higher executive pay levels by withholding or reducing donations.
Analyzing the compensation of the presidents of three hundred and forty colleges and
universities between 1999 and 2007, and controlling for a variety of institutional and
individual variables, Galle & Walker (2013) find that an additional dollar of compensation
in years Y - 1 or Y - 2 is associated with $30 less in donations in year Y. They also report
that increasing dependence on donations tends to reduce reported total compensation.
A difficulty with these earlier findings is the possibility of omitted variable bias.
Unobservable presidential ability, institutional culture, and similar factors may
simultaneously affect both donations and compensation.
Accordingly, in this paper we revisit the role of donors in a setting that we argue is
less susceptible to these econometric issues. We observe the effect on donations of
appearing in the Chronicle of Higher Education’s annual “top ten” lists of the highestcompensated college and university presidents. Using a differences-in-discontinuities
design to compare presidents appearing on a “top ten” list in each of three ranking
categories with others, we find that appearing on a top ten list is associated with reduced
average donations of between 2.8 and 4.5 million dollars, depending on the specification.

3

Electroniccopy
copy available
available at:
Electronic
at:https://ssrn.com/abstract=2363013
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2363013

This reduction, moreover, occurs despite increased fundraising effort and increased
enrollment at universities that appear on a top ten list. And we find some evidence that
top-ten appearances slow the growth of compensation in later years. We suggest that
these findings provide evidence that the added salience of appearing on the top ten list
increases the effectiveness of stakeholder monitoring, although we cannot rule out the
possibility that donors react disproportionately to top ten compensation.
While some econometric questions remain, we argue that this method represents an
advance over earlier work in that it more closely resembles random assignment to
treatment and control. In a group of over 100 rivals, whether a given president happens
to be the 9th or 11th-most highly paid in a particular year is essentially random. Thus
there should be little correlation between the “treatment,” top ten appearance, and any
omitted variables.
Our findings are potentially relevant to the operation and regulation of nonprofit
organizations. Evidence that donors react negatively to higher executive pay means that
donors are a potential source of monitoring and pay discipline, but the differential impact
of appearing on the CHE’s top ten list suggests that substantial agency costs remain in
this setting. It appears that donors are somewhat aware of but not fully attentive to the
pay-setting process, and their negative reaction to high pay when it is made salient
implies that process does not fully reflect their preferences.
Rent extraction affects firms not only by diminishing their resources but also by
changing managerial incentives. Again, we find some evidence that affected presidents
increase enrollment, which we suggest may be motivated by knowledge that larger
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colleges tend to pay more. Nor is there any reason to suspect that agency costs differ in
other forms of large, complex nonprofits. Our data therefore speak to the possibility of
added disclosure or other forms of regulatory oversight of nonprofit pay-setting.
Finally, our results also have implications for those interested in public company
executive pay or in the general institutional design of disclosure regimes. We find major
differences in the impact of information when it is packaged in a way that is readily
accessible and digestible by its consumers. While the nonprofit setting differs in
important ways from other institutions, our results in this respect are consistent with
suggestive earlier results in the public company context.
2. Theory and Prior Literature
2.1 Managerial Agency Costs at For-Profit and Nonprofit Organizations
Is executive compensation a reflection of agency costs, or is it instead a tool for
constraining them? While any sophisticated answer probably begins at “some of both,”
commentators vary in their view of the relative importance of the two possibilities. For
example, Bebchuk, Fried & Walker (2002) (“BFW”) suggest that “managerial power” and
agency slack play an outsized role both in the amount and form of executive compensation,
particularly at publicly-traded firms. Many others, however, hold that the high cost of
compensation at most public firms is typically an efficient response to the separation of
ownership from control. (E.g., Edmans & Gabaix 2009, Core et al. 2003, Murphy 2002).
Whatever the answer in the public company context, conventional wisdom suggests
that ideological alignment with donors serves to constrain rent-seeking by managers at
nonprofit firms (e.g., Caers et al. 2006, Jobome 2006, Roomkin & Weisbrod 1999, Rose-
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Ackerman 1996, Fama & Jensen 1983). The basic argument of this “stewardship theory,”
(Sedatole et al. 2013) is that managers self-select into employment at non-profits, where
they know that compensation will be lower. (Caers et al. 2006). Managers are therefore
motivated primarily by ideological or other mission-related goals. (Rose-Ackerman 1996).
Commentators suggest that this combination implies that investments in reducing agency
costs in the executive pay-setting context are not worthwhile, since any principal-agent
slack would be minimal. (Jegers 2008, Jobome 2006).
Galle & Walker (2013) suggest several reasons to be skeptical of the pay-setting
process at nonprofit institutions. Compensation may not be the foremost concern for these
managers, but it is surely an input in their utility function. Studies find some evidence of
pay for performance among non-profits, implying that managers indeed are motivated by
financial rewards. (Sedatole et al. 2013; see Galle & Walker 2013 for a review of the
evidence among private colleges and universities). Even if managers fully internalize the
benefit of the output of their firms, the marginal utility of a dollar for a firm of any
significant size is typically far lower than for the manager, leaving her with incentives to
shift funds to her own use.
Non-profit managers who perceive some value in additional compensation have
ample opportunities to extract it. As in the case of public companies, boards of directors
are charged with negotiating nonprofit executive pay. These boards are likely to be
relatively weak and the executives relatively strong with respect to the pay setting
process, and other matters, for the same reasons that public company boards are weak
and executives strong. First, nonprofit outside directors are part-timers who typically
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spend a small fraction of their time exercising oversight over the organization, while the
full time executives set the agenda and control the flow of information to the outside
directors. (Fishman 1987; cf. BFW 2002 describing the impact at public companies.)
Second, while public company directors are increasingly compensated with equity, most
nonprofit outside directors have little or no economic interest in their organizations.
(Hansmann 1980.) Third, as in the case of public companies, nonprofit outside directors
are likely to be bound to the senior executives through various formal and informal ties
that encourage a culture of deference to the executives. 1 (Main, O’Reilly & Wade 1995 (forprofits); Ben-Ner & Hoomissen 1994 (nonprofits)).
Moreover, external market forces are even less likely to provide effective discipline
over the executive pay-setting process in the nonprofit than the for-profit sector. There is
no organizational control market in the nonprofit sector, and, given the nature of the
sector, markets for capital and products are likely to be much less efficient than in the forprofit sector.
These disabilities have been recognized and the law does provide some responses.
State attorneys general have responsibility for nonprofit oversight, including oversight of
nonprofit executive pay. But state AGs are subject to their own agency problems and
resource constraints and it seems unreasonable to expect state AGs to provide discipline
over any but the most egregious cases of excessive nonprofit executive pay. Federal law in
theory also prohibits the distribution of profits to managers in the form of “excess”

1

U.S. tax law discourages conflicts of interest for pay-setting board members, but those rules provide for only a very modest
degree of independence. See Galle & Walker (2013) for additional discussion.
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compensation. In practice, however, federal rules are extraordinarily deferential to board
decisions.
2.2 Donor Monitoring of Nonprofit Executive Pay
Of course, nonprofit organizations have other stakeholders that could provide
effective monitoring of executive pay practices. Actual or potential outrage on the part of
one or more of these constituencies could influence even a weak board and strong
executive to restrain compensation. (BFW 2002). Generally speaking, these
constituencies include employees and donors, and in some cases, customers and grantmaking organizations.
This paper analyses the relationship between executive pay and donations at
private colleges and universities. Each of the aforementioned constituencies is present
and could potentially play a disciplining role with respect to compensation in this setting,
but we posit that contributors are most likely to play that role. The customers (students
and parents) of higher education are typically not repeat players and tend to focus
excessively on US News rankings. To our knowledge, government grant-making agencies
have shown no interest in university executive pay. University employees might play a
disciplining role but have limited leverage. Potential donors, however, may have
significant leverage as well as strong ideas about appropriate pay levels.
Although potential donors seem promising as a source of monitoring and pressure
on university boards and executives, it is not a given that they will exercise this role.
There are two primary obstacles.

8
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First, it is not obvious that donors care about pay levels or that they respond
negatively to high pay levels. There are a range of possible responses. Some donors may
be indifferent. Other donors may view high executive pay levels as a signal of quality that
justifies their support. Still others may view high compensation levels as waste, a signal
of poor governance, or an indication that the institution is already flush with funds. 2 Only
in these latter cases would we expect a negative association between pay and donation
levels and the existence of such an association would depend on the latter effect
outweighing any positive association between pay levels and donations.
Second, potential donors must be aware of executive pay levels. A lack of awareness
may arise from rational apathy, particularly in the case of modest contributions from
alumni; but poor awareness may be augmented by purposeful obfuscation by nonprofit
management. (Galle & Walker 2013.)
Therefore one of our central hypotheses is that changes in the salience of firm
governance information will affect stakeholder behavior. Given the natural inclination to
free ride on the data collection and analysis of others, news reports or other highly salient
disclosures could have an important impact on donations. Our theory derives from BFW
(2002), who assert that complicated and relatively opaque pay structures, such as large
pensions whose value is disclosed indirectly and in footnotes of public filings, are evidence
of managerial rent-seeking, with managers using complexity as a screen to conceal total
compensation.
2

Although the view is not unanimous, there is evidence in the public company realm that shareholders take a dim view of
high executive pay. Kimbro & Xu (2013) find that negative “say on pay” votes are associated with high levels of executive
pay. Cai & Walkling (2011) find that the unexpectedly overwhelming House passage of mandatory “say on pay” shareholder
voting in 2007 resulted in a positive market reaction at firms with high abnormal CEO pay levels, suggesting that the
discipline created by say on pay was welcome.
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Although retail shareholders and other casual observers of the firm are usually
rationally ignorant of firm governance, for BFW (2002) they are potentially important as a
source of outrage. Disclosure may subject managers to shame or other social discomfort.
Shareholders who feel strong emotional or ideological responses to high compensation may
come to treat firm activism as a private good, and therefore represent a source of latent
opposition to managerial plans.
Prior studies of pay disclosure have shed some light on this question but generally
have not been able to disentangle market reactions to the form of executive compensation
from reactions to its value. For example, Wei & Yermack (2011) find an abnormal
negative return among firms forced by a 2006 SEC regulation to disclose more clearly the
value of executive pensions. But, since managers promised pensions are effectively
creditors of the firm, this reaction may have represented concerns about managers’ risk
preferences more than responses to managerial rents.
Aside from Galle & Walker (2013), no previous study has examined the effect of
executive compensation on charitable contributions. Several earlier papers, however,
consider whether donors care about administrative costs, of which executive compensation
may be a component. Results are generally sensitive to specification, but the consensus
seems to be that administrative costs do matter at least at firms that are most dependent
on donations. (Kitching et al. 2012, Frumkin & Keating 2010, Jacobs & Marudas 2009,
Tinkelman & Mankaney 2007). Donors’ emotional connection to the institution is also
known to be an important aspect of giving. (E.g., Wright & Bocarnea 2007).
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The threat of donor responses frames a set of strategic choices for management.
Assuming that firm resources are an input into managers’ utility, negative shocks to firm
wealth should motivate greater fundraising through an income effect. (Andreoni & Payne
2011). However, if the shock is accompanied by reduced returns to fundraising, as well,
the net effect of the shock is ambiguous. (Galle & Nichols unpublished). Alternatively,
managers can curtail the sources of donor outrage, such as by reducing pay or making it
more opaque to donors. Galle & Walker (2013) summarize the prior literature on the
determinants of nonprofit pay, and report new findings that increasing dependence on
donations appears to reduce reported compensation.
However, endogeneity issues linger over most of these prior findings. In complex
institutions such as universities or public firms, causality questions and omitted variables
are inevitable. For example, unobservable aspects of a president’s skills and relationship
with stakeholders can affect both her pay and donations, leading to biased estimates of the
statistical relation between the two. Prior work, to the extent it has engaged with this
problem, has relied on instrumental variables and presidential fixed effects (Galle &
Walker 2013; Sedatole et al. 2013 similarly use system-GMM instrumental variables
methods to address endogeneity issues in the measurement of pay for performance), but it
remains unclear whether these techniques can fully control for potential biases.
3. Data and Methodology
In order to better deal with the possible endogeneity concerns mentioned above, we
employ here a regression-discontinuity design. The Chronicle of Higher Education reports
annually on the ten highest-paid college and university presidents in each of four
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categories: private baccalaureate colleges, private masters-granting institutions, private
research universities, and public universities. 3 We examine the effects of appearing on
one of the private-college or university lists. 4 Since a ranking of, say, nine rather than
twelve in any given year is essentially random, we in effect have random assignment to
treatment and control groups.
Universities and presidents can influence their likelihood of appearing in the Top
10, but cannot control it precisely. Executive compensation is generally disclosed by all
universities at roughly the same time, when their annual tax return is filed and made
available for public inspection. Each university can observe compensation disclosed in the
previous year, but average nominal compensation rises by roughly 9% annually in our
sample. Thus, while schools can greatly reduce their odds of avoiding the list by paying an
amount below what the 10th-ranked president earned for the prior year, any amount
greater than that may or may not land on the list, depending on how other universities
behave. 5
As Lee & Lemieux (2010) explain, even this small amount of uncertainty is
generally sufficient to make the regression-discontinuity design essentially equivalent to
random assignment. Nonetheless, we test the random-assignment assumption in several
different ways, as reported in more detail below.

3

CHE has varied its approach a bit over time. Before 1999, CHE ranked only the top five most highly compensated
presidents for each category. In 1999 CHE used five categories, splitting universities into research and non-research. And
for unclear reasons CHE did not produce top 10 lists for private colleges and universities in 2005.
4
We omit public universities because of data limitations and because their stakeholders, budget, and management structure
can differ considerably from those at public institutions.
5
Even paying below what would have been 10th for the prior year runs some risk of hitting the list, since some presidents’
pay may include one-time bonuses, rival presidents may retire, and rival boards may change the way that they report noncash compensation.
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Following the standard regression-discontinuity literature (Lee & Lemieux 2010,
Angrist & Pischke 2009), we estimate equations of the form:
=

+

+

+

+

)n +

(

(

)n

+

where rho represents the coefficient on the discontinuity, top-ten appearance, two periods
before donations or other outcome variables of interest are observed. We allow for the
possibility of different functional forms on either side of the discontinuity with the
normalization, z

c, which measures the distance in the assignment variable (here log of

the president’s total compensation) from the cutoff point. The cutoff point is determined
by the compensation of the lowest-ranked president appearing in the relevant list, and so
varies by year and category of institution. Following Trochim (2006), we initially include
higher polynomial terms of the normalization function, and then drop them where
insignificant.
We use a two-year lag of the discontinuity variable because CHE issues its report in
the November following each fiscal year, and any resulting donor or firm responses will
appear in the tax return for the fiscal year following that. For example, the November
2006 issue of CHE reports on FY 2005 compensation, and any resulting drop in donations
would occur primarily during the 2007 fiscal year. 6 We examine outcomes for the years
1998 through 2010, reflecting CHE top ten lists published from 1997 through 2009 (except
2005, when CHE published no private-university lists).

6

Most universities begin their fiscal year in the middle of the calendar year, which potentially allows for some drop in
donations in the same calendar year as the CHE report. When we include lags of only one year in our regression (e.g.,
donations in FY2006 for presidents whose 2005 compensation appeared in the Nov. 2006 top ten list), they have identical
signs to those reported below but are not generally statistically significant.
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In addition to its ranking of the top ten in each category, CHE also reports---in
smaller, densely printed type---salaries and benefits for approximately 300 other private
colleges and universities each year, listed in alphabetical order. 7 CHE draws its
information from Form 990 federal tax returns filed annually by each institution. We use
the detailed listings to compile our own ranking of presidential pay in each of the four
categories for each year. Unsurprisingly, since our rankings are also computed from the
CHE data, our top 10’s match exactly the CHE rankings.
We draw additional data from the National Center on Charitable Statistics’
database of Form 990 tax returns and from the National Center on Education Statistics. 8
A cautionary note on the compensation and fundraising data is that both sets of numbers
are self-reported and rarely subject to close government scrutiny. Since donors react
negatively to large fundraising expenditures (Okten & Weisbrod 2000), we expect that any
measured increases in reported fundraising are biased downwards. Further, we interpret
any compensation findings as the effects on reported compensation; we discuss whether
this distinction is important in section 4 below.
Our controls are mostly those now standard in the university literature, such as
assets, revenues, net tuition, student:faculty ratio, and return on investment. (See Galle
& Walker 2013 for more extensive discussion). Since donors may respond to school
conditions only with some delay, we run alternative regressions with lagged and sameyear controls, and report the lagged-control specifications because they are more precisely

7

A sample “top ten” page and detailed listing page are each reproduced in the Appendix.
We are grateful to the program on Tax Policy and Philanthropy at the Urban Institute for providing us with access to their
NCCS data.

8
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identified. 9 Because we find some evidence that fundraising and enrollment are
themselves outcomes variables, we do not control for them in the reported regressions.
(See Angrist & Pischke 2009:64-68 for discussion.) Our results are robust to including
controls for one or both of these variables.
As shown in the summary statistics in Table 1, below, institutions whose president
appears in the top 10 for any given year are fairly similar, if slightly larger on average,
than those whose president would rank in the next 10. In an average year, there are
about 62 baccalaureate colleges in our sample, along with 128 masters-granting
institutions and 113 research universities. 10 Therefore the top 20 are a relatively elite
group of presidents in each category, though certainly less so among liberal-arts colleges.
Table 1: Summary Statistics: 1997 to 2010
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Variable

Sample Mean

Std. Dev.

Rank 11 - 20 Mean

Top 10 Mean

CEO in Last Year? | 5405

.0323774

.1770167

Donations |

3.08e+07

8.04e+07

8.09e+07

9.08e+07

Donations / student | 6137 6709.577

9364.835

11725.77

11355.79

Execs / 100 FTE|

5945

2.674444

2.20487

3.138919

3.432617

Faculty |

5945

610.7583

1050.6

1166.255

1531.606

FTE enrollment |

6178

4235.813

4264.762

6532.188

7783.933

Fundraising exp. |

3799

2.73e+07

1.86e+08

6.96e+07

8.11e+07

Government grants | 5967 3.27e+07

1.12e+08

1.00e+08

1.08e+08

Liabilities |

1.22e+09

4.36e+08

6.31e+08

9

Obs

6157

5389

2.56e+08

Including lags does not meaningfully change the sign or magnitude of any coefficient of interest.
Because of missing data for some schools for some years, the exact number in each category varies each year.

10
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Log Assets |

5389

19.57549

1.232864

20.43433

20.67045

Net Tuition |

6165

7.39e+07

9.97e+07

1.27e+08

1.65e+08

Ret. on Investment |5381

4.38e+07

3.68e+08

1.27e+08

1.48e+08

Religious Affil.? |

6388

.5312107

.4990598

.2372372

.1515152

Share undergrad. | 3910

.8453141

.1661738

.8028724

.7948965

Total expenditures | 5387 2.21e+08

5.15e+08

4.53e+08

6.51e+08

Total CEO comp |

279042.5

552769.4

870259.8

6183

233917.4

|

Notes: Data cover the period 1997 to 2010. All dollar figures in 2009 dollars.

We omit from our regressions (but not the summary table above) presidents in the
last year of their term in office. In many cases, last-year presidents receive a large onetime payout. These payouts are sometimes characterized as cashing out of deferred
awards, but a better description in many cases would be a golden parachute, buyout, or
separation agreement. That is, the president encounters difficulty and is paid to leave.
Since donations might also be expected to fall in the wake of a controversy large enough to
force out the chief executive, including these observations might produce a spurious
negative correlation between pay and donations. In addition, in the case of a president
who exits between receiving her pay and its disclosure, it is less likely that donors would
“punish” the president by cutting back on donations.
We also omit presidents reporting zero compensation. In our sample these are
universally members of religious orders who take vows of poverty. While in practice the
president’s religious order may be reimbursed for her services, the exact value of that
reimbursement cannot usually be discerned from available sources.
4. Results and Discussion
4.1. Testing the Continuity Assumption
16
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A fundamental assumption of the regression-discontinuity design is that the
underlying assignment variable is continuous across the discontinuity. (Lee & Lemieux
2010, McCrary 2008.) In our context, we are assuming that the distribution of
compensation does not jump or drop at rank 10. For instance, if universities were aware
of the adverse affects of rankings, and could control their ranking precisely, we might
expect pay to bunch at just below the cutoff point, which would throw our results into
question.
A simple visual inspection reveals no discernible bunching or other discontinuity.
For example, figure one below graphs the distribution of log total compensation by
distance from the relevant “top ten” or “top five” cutoff point for each academic
year/university category grouping.
<Fig. 1: Figures follow references section in this version>

Figure One: Distribution of President Pay Relative to Lowest CHE-Reported
Pay, 1997-2009
More formal testing, as in McCrary (2008), also shows no evidence that the assignment or
control variables are discontinuous at the cutoff point (or elsewhere).
4.2 Main Results
Turning to the regression analysis, we examine three different dependent variables.
Our first set of regressions, reported in Table 2 below, considers the effect of top-ten
inclusion on donations. As suggested in Lee & Lemieux (2010), we estimate results using
pooled OLS, as well as panel regressions. Columns one and two reports the impact on
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donations per full-time equivalent enrollee, while columns three and four report first
differences of donations per FTE. Columns one and three are random-effects panel
regressions, while columns two and four are pooled OLS. 11 All results are reported as loglog, except for indicator variables, which are of course reported level-log.

11

We also obtain similar results, but less precisely estimated, using fixed-effects panel regressions.
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Table 2: Effect of “Top Ten” Appearance on Gross Donations Per Student
VARIABLES
CHE Top List?
dis_to_cutoff
D x dis_to_cut
dis_to_cut_2
D x dis_to_cut_2
lagged total comp
assets
expends
return on investment
net tuition
R-squared

(1)
OLS RE

(2)
OLS Pooled

(3)
1st Diff RE

(4)
1st Diff Pooled

-0.128**
(0.0600)
-0.0237
(0.0217)
0.0250
(0.290)
0.00648*
(0.00358)
-0.107
(0.183)
0.0714
(0.0447)
0.553***
(0.0644)
0.599***
(0.110)
-0.00383***
(0.000391)
0.0798
(0.0541)
.736

-0.159**
(0.0730)
0.0222
(0.0354)
-0.155
(0.374)
-0.00578
(0.00659)
-0.0207
(0.252)
-0.0371
(0.0521)
0.599***
(0.0328)
0.499***
(0.0512)
-0.00267***
(0.000655)
0.0905**
(0.0417)
0.741

-0.107**
(0.0501)
-0.0525
(0.0749)
0.590**
(0.278)
0.0138
(0.0165)
-0.441**
(0.189)
0.0284
(0.0763)
-0.0156
(0.0158)
0.0463*
(0.0251)
-0.000316
(0.000562)
0.0110
(0.0217)
.032

-0.107**
(0.0543)
-0.0525
(0.0724)
0.590**
(0.289)
0.0138
(0.0160)
-0.441**
(0.189)
0.0284
(0.0760)
-0.0156
(0.0342)
0.0463
(0.0432)
-0.000316
(0.000646)
0.0110
(0.0375)
0.032

Notes: All columns include state, year, and Carnegie group 2000 effects, as well as liabilities, share
of undergraduates enrolled, executives per enrollment, and total faculty (insignificant controls). All
variables reported in logs. Columns (1) & (3): random effects regressions. Columns (2) & (4): pooled
OLS regressions. Robust standard errors, clustered by university, in parentheses. N=3,400.
Number of clusters: 376. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

We find that appearing on a top-ten list on average reduces subsequent donations
by between 10 and 16 percent in the short term. 12 Since the mean gifts/student in our
sample is $6710, that corresponds to an average drop of between $670 and $1070 per

12

The smaller coefficient for the first-difference regressions may reflect the possibility that some donor reactions occur in the
same fiscal year as the release of the CHE results.
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student, or from $2.8 million to $4.5 million in total. 13 Results for changes in total
donations, without scaling for enrollment, are similar. Figure Two summarizes our
results graphically, employing a polynomial-fit graph.
<Fig. 2>
Figure Two: Plot of Gifts Per Student Against Distance to Cutoff
These estimates may somewhat understate donors’ reactions. If university
administrators are aware that potential donors are displeased by pay disclosures, they
may respond by increasing fundraising effort. We find evidence across a variety of
specifications that appearing on a CHE top ten or top five list increases fundraising and
fundraising per student, but the 95% confidence intervals are quite wide, with estimates
ranging from slight decreases to more than 150 percent increases. Similarly, we find that
the average effects of top ten appearances on donations net of fundraising are an order of
magnitude larger than the effects reported in Table 2, but those results were not
statistically significant at the 5% level. Figure three depicts net donations on either side
of the top ten (or top five) cutoff.
<Fig. 3>
Figure Three: Plot of Net Gifts Per Student Against Distance to Cutoff
Next, given our hypothesis, derived from BFW (2002), that it is fear of these kinds
of latent responses to disclosure that typically constrain executive pay, we expect that the
upward shock to outrage that the top ten list produces should also curtail future pay
13

We additionally run each regression for each of the three CHE categories separately, to allow coefficients to vary across
groups. We find the largest effects among colleges, while effects at research universities are still negative but not significant
in some specifications. This pattern is consistent with a story in which donor reactions depend on the extent to which the
CHE news is a genuine surprise: Since research universities receive much more attention, and their presidents are more
prone to appear on the list year after year, the top ten announcement is less likely to change donors’ prior beliefs about those
schools.
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increases. Accordingly, we report in Table 3 the effects of top ten or top five appearances
on subsequent rates of compensation growth. Column one reports a random-effects panel
regression, while column two reports pooled OLS. We also obtain essentially identical
results using a fixed-effects panel.
Table 3: Effects of Top Ten Appearance on Logged Subsequent Pay
VARIABLES
CHE Top List?
dis_to_cutoff
D x dis_to_cut
dis_to_cut_2
D x dis_to_cut_2
lagged total comp
R-squared

(1)
OLS RE

(2)
OLS Pooled

-0.0987***
(0.0326)
-0.0106
(0.0118)
0.182
(0.200)
0.00314
(0.00220)
-0.251*
(0.138)
6.91e-08
(7.15e-08)
.019

-0.0987**
(0.0406)
-0.0106
(0.0147)
0.182
(0.210)
0.00314
(0.00264)
-0.251
(0.154)
6.91e-08
(9.18e-08)
0.019

Notes: All columns include state, year, and Carnegie group 2000 effects, as well as religious
affiliation, liabilities, assets, revenues, expenditures, return on investment, net tuition, share
undergraduate enrollment, executives per 100 FTE employees, and total faculty (insignificant
controls). All variables reported in logs. N: 2,798. First-difference regressions. Column (1): random
effects regression. Column (2): pooled OLS. Robust standard errors clustered by university in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Here we find some evidence consistent with our theory that positive shocks to
outrage diminish future pay. In particular, we find that the rate of pay growth declines a
fair bit, by about 10% of total compensation, relative to the rate of growth of other
presidents’ pay. Real mean pay increases over the same two-year period are about 14% in
our sample, implying that top ten presidents’ pay grew at only about 4% over the same
time frame. This drop could simply represent mean reversion. However, in placebo tests
21
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we observe no significant drop for presidents ranking eleven through twenty, which tends
to support our donor-pressure theory. Figure four represents the compensation results
graphically.
<Fig. 4>
Figure Four: Plot of Change in Log Compensation Against Distance to Cutoff
4.3 Robustness Analysis
As a robustness check, we re-estimate each of the regressions using kernel
regressions for each side of the discontinuity. We optimize kernel bandwidth using the
calculations from Fuji, Imbens, and Kalyanaraman (2009), as implemented in Stata by
Nichols (2011). In the gifts per student regressions, at the predicted optimal bandwidths,
we estimate a coefficient for rho of about -.37, statistically significant at the .01% level.
Although Nichols (2011) counsels against including covariates, we find that result is
robust to including our controls.
Notably, this effect is two to three times larger than the effect we measure with
OLS, implying that the cost of a top ten appearance may be as high as $ 9 million on
average. However, our results are sensitive to choice of bandwidth; at bandwidths of half
optimal and below, the effect is somewhat smaller and no longer statistically significant.
We similarly find larger and more precise results for the effect of top ten or top five
appearance on donations net of fundraising. In the OLS regressions, we found a large and
negative, but imprecisely measured, average effect. Kernel regressions suggest a net
impact of about -.41, again statistically significant at the .01% level at optimal or larger
bandwidths. Results with smaller bandwidths again are not significant and somewhat
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smaller in magnitude. Results for fundraising alone are similar in magnitude and
significance to our OLS results.
Finally, our kernel regressions somewhat confirm our findings for the impact of top
ten appearances on later compensation growth. While the magnitude of the effect is
similar, about -.14, it is just short of significant at the 10% level at optimum bandwidth
(though significant at the 5% level at larger bandwidths).
In addition, to test the robustness of our results to using some cutoff point other
than the one reported in CHE, we ranked each president by university category and
academic year, and created a placebo dummy variable for presidents who ranked
twentieth or higher. We then repeated our analysis using the placebo dummy. Under
either OLS or kernel regression analysis for the placebo dummy, we found either no
statistically significant effects, or effects that were significant but of opposite sign from our
principal analysis (and relatively small in magnitude). As Table One demonstrates, top
twenty universities are fairly similar to the top ten. The absence of any evidence that
ranking in the top twenty negatively affects donations or subsequent compensation growth
therefore strongly supports our hypothesis that it is CHE’s reporting, and not some other
shared feature of top ten membership, that is driving our results.
We also conduct a set of robustness checks employing variations on our OLS
analysis. We repeat the random effects regressions using population-average or “general
estimating equation” regressions, which do not require any assumptions about the
correlation of the unit-level effects and the other regressors. Results are robust to either
specification. We further obtain essentially identical results when omitting controls for
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lagged executive compensation, and when using same-year controls rather than lags for
other variables.

4.4 Implications for Nonprofit Organizations
Overall, our results are consistent with the theory that agency costs in the nonprofit
executive pay-setting process are considerable. The compensation data reported by CHE
were publicly available prior to publication, and during the later periods of our sample
could be found for free on at least two major on-line aggregators of nonprofit tax returns.
Data on schools outside the top ten are printed in the same issue as the top ten list, albeit
in a format that makes cross-firm comparisons cumbersome. (We reproduce a sample
image of both listings in the Appendix). The fact that donors respond so strongly when
comparative compensation information is provided to them very readily, but have little
response to pay disclosures otherwise, thus implies that donors exert very little effort in
gathering pay information.
Our finding also suggest that managers take advantage of this slack to set pay
levels above donors’ preferences. 14 Presidents in the “top twenty” paying masters-granting
14
While high agency costs do not necessarily imply lower social welfare in this context, we think in many cases they do. By
definition, charitable organizations in the U.S. provide positive externalities to firm outsiders. It may be that higher pay
levels would permit the firm to produce benefits of higher quality or at lower total cost, once the effects of quality leadership
are taken into account. “Impurely altruistic” donors---those who give for reasons other than the welfare of beneficiaries (see
Andreoni 1989 for more discussion) -- may have ideological or emotionally-driven preferences for lower pay levels, which
could result in social under-production of the charitable good.
But the nonprofit entrepreneur’s willingness to accept sub-market returns is a key costly signal of her commitment
not to seek rents. (Hansmann 1981). Donors who punish highly-paid managers may also be helping to discipline the
manager’s other, even less observable behaviors, helping to ensure that managers do not misappropriate charitable resources
for personal ends.
Even if donors would set pay at inefficiently low levels, we doubt that making pay more opaque is the best
regulatory solution. Though there might be benefits at some firms, others would experience greater managerial waste.
Heightened transparency, combined with higher social subsidies for firms where greater CEO pay would add social value,
would in our view better solve any potential problem along the lines we’ve described.
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institutions are typically in about the 94th percentile of pay for their university category.
While in theory it may be that donors are content with the pay level of the 11th-ranked
president, even while others are discontent with the pay of the 9th-ranked president, the
more plausible explanation is that donors to schools ranked eleven through twenty are
simply inattentive to the president’s compensation.
It might be argued that the agency costs we document are modest, since excess pay
is small relative to the overall budgets of universities. The true significance of agency
costs, however, is not in pay alone, but in other managerial decisions that might be
motivated by it. For example, presidents may manage their schools in ways that reduce
dependence on donors or strengthen their arguments for exceptionally high pay. It is well
known that pay levels tend to rise for schools of greater wealth and size. (See Galle &
Walker 2013 for a review.)
Accordingly, we also tested for whether top ten appearances are correlated with
changes in tuition or enrollment. We find mixed but suggestive evidence that presidents
appearing on top lists subsequently increase enrollment. Depending on specification, our
OLS estimates yield 95% confidence intervals as low as between 0 to 3% enrollment
increase, and as high as .2 to 11.6%. Kernel regressions again suggest a rather larger
effect, up as much as 20%, and are significant at the 1% level. We find no comparable
effects in placebo tests; that is, “Top 20” presidents do not increase enrollment. Figure six
illustrates the enrollment results graphically.
<Fig. 6>
Figure Six: Plot of Enrollment Against Distance to Cutoff
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Our results can thus be read as support for more carefully considering the legal
regime for monitoring nonprofit managers. Galle & Walker (2013) argue that existing
nonprofit regulatory and governance structures are premised on “ideological alignment” or
“stewardship” theories -- that is, these regimes assume that managers can generally be
trusted not to extract rents in the form of excess compensation. Our work here suggests
that the current regime is not particularly effective at cabining opportunities for rents.
Our results are, however, consistent with prior theory (e.g., in Paredes 2005) that simple,
comparative information provided in a relatively salient way by a credible intermediary
can be more effective. 15 But of course it might be difficult to extend a “top ten” model to a
larger group of firms. Therefore other governance options, such as more demanding
regulatory processes, lower judicial deference to the board’s decisions, or private
alternatives such as paid third-party monitoring likely deserve closer consideration. (See
Galle & Walker 2013 for more discussion of these possibilities).
4.5 Implications for For-Profit Firms
Our results may also shed some light on the behavior of managers and shareholders
in publicly-traded firms. Many commentators are skeptical that government regulation of
the manner in which executive pay is disclosed is necessary or effective. Assuming that
information is available in some format, skeptics suggest, rational investors for whom
those data are important should be able to acquire it and trade appropriately. Our
findings here, to the contrary, suggest that the salience of information---the ease of

15

We caution that, since our data are self-reported by universities, we cannot cleanly separate genuine reductions in pay from
changes in reporting methodology. Thus, it is not entirely clear that disclosure is effective at reducing pay levels. What is
clear, at least, is that increased salience of pay reporting changes managerial behavior, either in the setting of pay or in the
reporting of it.
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acquiring it and understanding it in context---can affect stakeholder behavior, which in
turn may influence managerial behavior.
To be sure, public firms offer greater opportunities for arbitrage by better-informed
traders, such that rent-extracting pay may not be as easy to hide. But together with our
findings, results such as Wei & Yermack (2011), in which markets react to data that could
have been computed, albeit with some effort, before the change in disclosure, imply that
opacity may well play a role in public firms.
Moreover, evidence that top 10 appearances are associated with moderation in
subsequent presidential pay lends some support to the broader managerial power theory
of the pay-setting process, which is significant for students of public company executive
pay. That theory predicts that university boards and presidents would respond to the
outrage associated with highly salient top 10 disclosure by moderating pay. Of course, the
relationships between stakeholders and the boards and executives of public companies and
private universities are somewhat different, but, as discussed above, the agency problems
in the two settings are sufficiently similar that evidence of managerial power in the
nonprofit sector should bolster the case for the theory more generally.
5. Conclusion
We have examined the effects of more-salient disclosures of executive compensation
on donor and firm behavior. Overall, we find that appearing in a Chronicle of Higher
Education “Top Ten” list for most-highly compensated college and university presidents
depresses donations by an average of about $2.8 to $4.5 million in the fiscal year following
disclosure. We also find evidence that disclosures slow the growth of executive pay, which
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we argue is a product of increased scrutiny by stakeholders. We suggest these results
imply significant principal-agent slack in the setting of non-profit pay. We further find
some evidence that top-ten managers increase fundraising expenditures and enrollment,
implying that agency slack affects outcomes other than compensation alone.
Finally, we also add some detail to the existing scholarly picture of the relationship
between nonprofit managers and their stakeholders. We are the first to examine donor
responses to executive pay, as well as the first to document that firms may increase
fundraising effort in response to adverse disclosures.
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